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THE NDAA, AUMF, AND CITIZENS DETAINED 
AWAY FROM THE THEATER OF WAR: 
SOUNDING A CLARION CALL FOR A CLEAR 
STATEMENT RULE 
Diana Cho∗ 
       In the armed conflict resulting from the September 11 attacks, the 
executive authority to order the indefinite detention of citizens captured 
away from the theater of war is an issue of foreign and domestic 
significance. The relevant law of armed conflict provisions relevant to 
conflicts that are international or non-international in nature, however, 
do not fully address this issue. Congress also intentionally left the 
question of administrative orders of citizen detainment unresolved in a 
controversial provision of the 2012 version of the annually-enacted 
National Defense Authorization Act. While plaintiffs in Hedges v. 
Obama sought to challenge the enforceability of NDAA’s section 1021 
on the basis that it permitted indefinite detention of citizens who are far 
removed from the theater of war, they were denied relief on the basis of 
standing and the issue continues to remain undecided. A revision of the 
language of section 1021, such as one suggested in this Article, might 
sufficiently quell the fears raised by the Hedges plaintiffs. Yet given that 
the recent versions of the NDAA have left this provision intact, this 
Article recommends applying a clear statement rule to section 1021 to 
construe that provision as not permitting the indefinite detention of 
citizens captured away from the theater of war. 
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Sociology,
University of Texas, Austin, 2011. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor David 
Glazier for his patience and invaluable guidance in this endeavor. I am forever indebted to the 
many law school colleagues, particularly Cameron Bell and Andrew Beshai, who sacrificed much 
time and energy to see this Article to fruition. Finally, I am most grateful for the steadfast support 
and encouragement from my older sister, who has always believed in me. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the conflict formerly known as the “war on terror” lingers on 
into its thirteenth year, the issue regarding indefinite detention of 
American citizens captured on American soil who are alleged to be 
enemy combatants remains unresolved.1 The Bush administration 
characterized the conflict as a worldwide war against all terrorist 
forces responsible for 9/112 and claimed broad authority under the 
executive’s Article II war powers to validate the substandard 
treatment of unlawful “enemy combatants,” effectively eschewing 
law of armed conflict (LOAC) standards.3 While the American 
people and the global community stood behind the decision to use 
military force against those responsible for 9/11,4 support for the 
“war on terror” quickly developed into strident criticism of President 
Bush’s wartime policies.5  
In its second decade the conflict evolved from a full-scale war 
effort to scattered “overseas contingency operations” as associations 
to the forces behind the World Trade Centers and Pentagon attacks 
weaken and become increasingly attenuated.6 President Obama 
1. See infra Part III; Diane Webber, Preventive Detention in the Law of Armed Conflict:
Throwing Away the Key?, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 167 (2012). 
2. Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1099, 1100 (Sept. 11,
2001); Memorandum from George W. Bush to the White House (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush 
Memorandum], available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_e
d.pdf.
3. Several of President Bush’s closest advisors warned that declaring the Geneva
Conventions inapplicable to the conflict would reverse a century of reliance on international 
treaties, undermine protections of American soldiers involved in the conflict, and garner 
international criticism. See Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State to Counsel to 
President George W. Bush (Jan. 26, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEB
B/NSAEBB127/02.01.26.pdf; Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, to 
Counsel to the President (Feb. 2, 2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/polit
ics/20040608_DOC.pdf; see infra Part II.A. 
4. See generally JENNIFER L. MEROLLA & ELIZABETH J. ZECHMEISTER, DEMOCRACY AT 
RISK: HOW TERRORIST THREATS AFFECT THE PUBLIC 131, 140 (2009) (discussing increased 
public support for political authority figures that took a hardline approach on terrorism); Jack M. 
Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under International Law, 25 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 568–70 (2002). 
5. At Home and Abroad, Bush’s ‘War on Terror’ Faces Mounting Criticism, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 30, 2002, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/1230-03.htm; see 
G. Scott Morgan et al., The Expulsion from Disneyland: The Social Psychological Impact of 9/11,
66 AM. PSYCHOL. 447, 450 (2011).
6. See Jonathan Hafetz, Military Detention in the “War on Terrorism”: Normalizing the
Exceptional After 9/11, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 42–46 (2012); Scott Wilson & Al 
Kamen, ‘Global War on Terror’ Is Given New Name, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html. 
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quickly abandoned the heavy-handed rhetoric of his predecessor, 
stressing that the laws of war inform his wartime policies and that the 
Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF)7 statutorily 
authorizes his war powers.8 Indeed, in his 2014 State of the Union 
address, President Obama issued optimistic statements regarding the 
end of the current conflict against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.9 Yet try 
as he might to divorce himself from President Bush’s wartime 
agenda, President Obama has failed to make good on his promise to 
permanently shutter Guantánamo’s doors and has actually ramped up 
the use of drone strikes to terminate suspected terrorist adversaries.10 
So it comes as no surprise that Congress, ten years after 9/11, 
would find itself at an impasse over section 1021, a provision in 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 
(NDAA)11 that could expand or limit the president’s detention 
7. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)); Letter to
Congressional Leaders on the Global Deployments of United States Combat-Equipped Armed 
Forces, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Dec. 13, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
/pkg/DCPD-201300853/pdf/DCPD-201300853.pdf. 
8. There is a notable difference between being “informed” by the laws of war, and adhering
to the laws of war. This Article does not address the reasons and ramifications related to President 
Obama’s reluctance to fully align his wartime policies with international law of war principles. 
See Remarks at the National Archives and Records Administration, 1 PUB. PAPERS 689, 694–95 
(May 21, 2009); Benjamin Wittes, Continuity and Change: Towards a Synthesis, LAWFARE 
(Dec. 17, 2010, 9:53 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/continuity-and-change-towards-
a-synthesis/#.Uv5fEf2C5Hw. 
9. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 2014 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 7 (Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD 
-201400050/pdf/DCPD-201400050.pdf. Given that the “war on terror” terminology lacks legal
precision, this Article will refer to the current conflict as the conflict against al-Qaeda and the
Taliban.
10. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 203 (2009); Michael Price, Guantanamo Update,
CHAMPION, Nov. 2009, at 55; David Wagner, Obama’s Failed Promise to Close Gitmo: A 
Timeline, ATLANTIC WIRE (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2013/01/ 
obama-closing-guantanamo-timeline/61509; Wittes, supra note 8. 
11. Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011) [hereinafter NDAA]. The text section 1021 of
the NDAA is as follows: 
Sec. 1021. AFFIRMATION OF AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE 
UNITED STATES TO DETAIN COVERED PERSONS PURSUANT TO THE 
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE.  
(a) IN GENERAL.—Congress affirms that the authority of the President to use all
necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(Public Law 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority for the Armed Forces
of the United States to detain covered persons (as defined in subsection (b)) pending
disposition under the law of war.
(b) COVERED PERSONS.—A covered person under this section is any person as
follows:
(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks. (2) A
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authority under the AUMF.12 The result of the senators’ standoff 
over section 1021 of the NDAA was a compromise that essentially 
purported to do nothing new to executive detention authority 
concerning American citizens.13 However, section 1021 incorporates 
language absent from the AUMF that some argue subjects citizens as 
well as noncitizens with trivial ties to terrorists to indefinite detention 
without due process, an issue raised by the group of plaintiffs in a 
recent Second Circuit case, Hedges v. Obama.14 And while President 
Obama has made clear he will not be interpreting the NDAA to 
person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly 
supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.  
(c) DISPOSITION UNDER LAW OF WAR.—The disposition of a person under the
law of war as described in subsection (a) may include the following:
(1) Detention under the law of war without trial until the end of the hostilities
authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force.
(2) Trial under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code (as amended by the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 (title XVIII of Public Law 111–84)).
(3) Transfer for trial by an alternative court or competent tribunal having lawful
jurisdiction.
(4) Transfer to the custody or control of the person’s country of origin, any other
foreign country, or any other foreign entity.
(d) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section is intended to limit or expand the
authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force.
(e) AUTHORITIES.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect existing law
or authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens
of the United States, or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United
States.
12. See 157 CONG. REC. S7,941 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2011) (statement of Sen. Paul) (“We are
talking about American citizens who could be taken from the United States and sent to a camp at 
Guantánamo Bay and held indefinitely.”); id. at S7,945 (statement of Sen. Udall) (“The 
provisions authorize the indefinite military detention of American citizens who are suspected of 
involvement in terrorism—even those captured here in our own country . . . .”); id. at S7,950 
(statement of Sen. Webb) (“I am . . . very concerned about the notion of the protection of our own 
citizens and our legal residents from military action inside our own country.”); id. at S7,953 
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (“As currently written, the language in this bill would authorize the 
military to indefinitely detain individuals—including U.S. citizens—without charge or trial. I am 
fundamentally opposed to indefinite detention, and certainly when the detainee is a U.S. citizen 
held without charge.”). 
13. NDAA, supra note 11, § 1021(e); see 157 CONG. REC. S8,157 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011)
(amendment proposed by Sen. Feinstein) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect 
existing law or authorities, relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident 
aliens of the United States or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United 
States.”). 
14. 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013).
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authorize indefinite detention of citizens,15 there is no guarantee that 
his presidency will outlast the current conflict. 
Accordingly, given that the “war on terror” has already left an 
indelible mark upon the American psyche,16 it is a worthwhile 
endeavor to address the unanswered question of citizen detention 
raised by this conflict in preparation for similar challenges that may 
emerge during other conflicts. Recognizing that indefinite detention 
of U.S. citizens is not a novel concept to the American people, but in 
fact has previously occurred in this nation’s history as a fear-driven 
reaction to an unfamiliar, foreign enemy is crucial to preventing 
abuses of due process rights in the future.17 The undeniably domestic 
nature and impact of citizen detention implicates separation of 
powers concerns as threats that emerge within the United States by 
terrorist actors warrant prompt executive action, with or without 
legislative support. Therefore, an informed judiciary is paramount to 
keeping the executive and legislative branches from perpetuating 
politically advantageous wartime policies that may not withstand 
judicial scrutiny.18  
This Article acknowledges that the term unlawful “enemy 
combatant” is not a formal designation under the LOAC.19 As such, 
this Article refers to enemy threats as “terrorist adversaries” or 
simply “combatants” and argues that while LOAC provisions 
governing international and non-international armed conflicts 
probably permit the president to indefinitely detain a properly 
designated terrorist adversary, an analysis of the president’s foreign 
affairs power under Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer20 
15. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 2 (Dec. 31, 2011). 
16. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses To Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 122 YALE L.J. 1011, 1038–41 (2003); David Sirota, The Long-Term Legacy of 
9/11, SALON (July 26, 2011, 10:01 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/07/26/9_11_terrorism_ 
legacy; see, e.g., Mark A. Schuster et al., A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the 
September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks, 345 N. ENGL. J. MED 1507 (2001) (analyzing the mental 
health effects of 9/11 upon American adults revealing at least 90 percent experienced some stress 
symptom from the attacks). 
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1549 (2009). 
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). 
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would support a finding that this executive detention authority does 
not extend to U.S. citizens captured on U.S. soil.  
Therefore, this Article suggests that courts adjudicating the 
detention of U.S. citizens apply a clear statement rule to section 1021 
of the 2012 version of the NDAA to require an express act of 
Congress permitting the indefinite detention of alleged citizen 
terrorist adversaries. Courts may then determine what due process is 
afforded to the alleged terrorist adversary by applying the 
well-known Mathews v. Eldridge21 balancing test, taking into 
account the alleged terrorist adversary’s status as an American 
citizen and the heightened constitutional protections that individuals 
gain by virtue of capture or arrest on American soil.22 Alternatively, 
this Article proposes a two-fold revision of NDAA’s section 
1021: (1) an express prohibition of indefinite detainment of U.S. 
citizens captured domestically and (2) authorization to detain any 
other person arrested or detained in the United States only to the 
extent permissible under existing law and authorities.  
Part II provides background information on the now-rejected 
“enemy combatant” terminology and discusses the scope and limits 
of the president’s constitutional and statutory authority to detain 
individuals in international and non-international armed conflicts. 
Part III discusses cases involving citizens deemed terrorist 
adversaries in the current conflict and the lack of consistency in the 
courts regarding the executive’s detention authority over citizens 
arrested away from the theater of war. 
Part IV argues that the Non-Detention Act passed in the early 
1970s in response to the Cold War that prohibited citizen detention 
should be construed as prohibiting both military and non-military 
detention of citizens without clear congressional authorization to the 
contrary.23 Part IV asserts that the AUMF and NDAA do not 
provide the congressional authorization necessary to trump the 
Non-Detention Act. Therefore, under the Youngstown framework, 
the president is likely within the zone where his actions are in 
contravention to congressional will and even his expansive plenary 
21. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
22. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528–33 (2004).
23. Non-Detention Act, Pub. L. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (1971) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
(2006)). 
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foreign affairs powers are diminished to some extent.24 Thus, any 
executive decision to detain a citizen without trial would be subject 
to searching judicial scrutiny. 
Part V proposes that when a U.S. citizen detained on U.S. soil is 
alleged to be a terrorist adversary but disputes that designation, 
courts should apply a clear statement rule to the AUMF and NDAA, 
which would allow courts to interpret the controversial section 1021 
of the 2012 NDAA in ways that ensure due process protections are 
afforded to American citizens. Within these narrow circumstances, 
the president’s war powers under the Constitution, the AUMF, the 
NDAA, and the LOAC are justifiably balanced and limited by 
judicial backstops that preserve fundamental civil liberties at home. 
II. SCOPE OF THE PRESIDENT’S DETENTION AUTHORITY UNDER THE
LOAC, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE AUMF AND NDAA
Armed conflicts are generally categorized as either international
or non-international in nature.25 International armed conflicts (IACs) 
are those conflicts that arise between nation states whereas 
non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) occur in the territory of a 
single sovereign nation between a state and a non-state actor.26 Thus, 
by definition, a NIAC typically refers to an internal civil war in 
which the national government may treat members of the insurgent 
group not as belligerents, but as criminals subject to the nation’s laws 
and punitive treatment.27 As a result, the combatant designation 
generally does not apply in NIACs but does apply in IACs to 
describe enemy belligerents. Nonetheless, under the separate LOAC 
provisions that govern IACs and NIACs, respectively, a sovereign is 
empowered to detain properly designated threats to the nation’s 
security.28  
A. The Rise and Fall of the “Enemy Combatant”
Status in the Present Armed Conflict 
An issue that potentially incited greater confusion and 
controversy than the characterization of the conflict was the Bush 
24. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
25. David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 991 (2009). 
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See infra Part II.B.
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administration’s use of a novel designation of terrorist adversaries as 
“enemy combatants.”29 This label eschewed the traditional 
dichotomous terminology of participants in an IAC as combatants or 
civilians.30  
The notion of unlawful combatancy emerged in the World War 
II case Ex parte Quirin.31 In Quirin, the Supreme Court held that a 
group of Nazi soldiers could be tried as unlawful belligerents by a 
military commission rather than by a jury, because they had “shed 
their uniforms intending to engage in acts of military sabotage.”32 
The Court also denied the habeas petitions of the German saboteurs 
who held American citizenship, reasoning that “[c]itizenship in the 
United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve [the]m from 
the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in 
violation of the law of war.”33 Unlawful combatancy has historically 
been invoked to describe certain participants in armed conflicts such 
as spies who “fail[] to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population during attacks” and thus cannot shroud themselves within 
combatant immunity nor shield themselves from administrative 
detention by a belligerent party without access to courts or lawyers.34 
The Bush administration relied on this idea of unlawful “enemy 
combatants” to label al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters as such.  
Justice Department memos issued by the Bush administration 
justified the classification of terrorist combatants associated with 
al-Qaeda and the Taliban as unlawful “enemy combatants.”35 
Focusing on the fact that Taliban and al-Qaeda militants do not wear 
uniforms with a distinguishable emblem or openly bear arms while 
carrying out acts of terror in contravention to the laws of war, 
President Bush’s wartime administration determined that al-Qaeda 
29. Memorandum for Daniel J. Bryant, Ass’t Att’y Gen., from John Yoo, Deputy Ass’t Att’y
Gen. (June 27, 2002), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/detention.pdf; Memorandum 
for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, from John Yoo, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen. (Jan. 9, 
2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf. 
30. Glazier, supra note 25, at 996–1006.
31. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
32. Id. at 2; Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 715 (2d Cir. 2003).
33. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37–38.
34. Glazier, supra note 25, at 1011–12.
35. See Memorandum for Daniel J. Bryant, Ass’t Att’y Gen., from John Yoo, Deputy Ass’t
Att’y Gen. (June 27, 2002), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/detention.pdf; 
Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, from John Yoo, Deputy Ass’t Att’y 
Gen. (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01 
.09.pdf. 
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and the Taliban do not conform to the requirements of lawful 
combatancy set forth in the Hague Regulations of 1907.36 Based on 
this assessment, the government maintained the position that 
classifying detainees as “enemy combatants” sanctioned deprivation 
of certain international legal protections.37 Under the mantle of 
inherent constitutional power as commander-in-chief and ostensibly 
unrestricted by the LOAC forbidding the cruel or degrading 
treatment of detainees, President Bush initiated a massive detention 
campaign to transport alleged “enemy combatants” to Guantánamo 
Bay to endure interrogation techniques that often bordered on 
torture.38  
Indeed, the few terrorist actors who orchestrated the events of 
September 11 might aptly be named unlawful combatants in the “war 
on terror,” but extending that definition to all of the forces in 
Afghanistan without regard for a more nuanced determination of 
lawful combatant status appears to have been an excessive use of 
wartime authority.39 In light of the far-reaching protections in Article 
75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for 
“persons who do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the 
Conventions,”40 the Bush administration’s approach to treat “enemy 
combatants” as beyond the reach of the LOAC appears to be a failed 
attempt to strip detainees of rights guaranteed under the LOAC 
and domestic law.41 Indeed, as discussed below, the LOAC 
36. Lawful combatancy covers any person involved in a militia or volunteer corps who
“(1) is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (2) has a fixed distinctive 
emblem recognizable at a distance; (3) carries arms openly; and (4) conducts their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war.” Second Hague Peace Conference Convention 
Regarding the Laws of and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens 
(3d) 461; Glazier, supra note 25, at 998–1001, 1007. See Memorandum from Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Legal Counsel, for President George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), available at 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf. 
37. Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which applies to spies, saboteurs, and other
unlawful combatants, states that “such persons shall . . . be treated with humanity and, in case of 
trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present 
Convention.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil Persons in Time of War art. 
2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC-IV]. 
38. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and the War
on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 8–12 (2006). 
39. See Glazier, supra note 25, at 1013.
40. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 438 [hereinafter 
Protocol I]. 
41. See supra Part II.B. Certain human rights laws and international treaty provisions have
been directly codified into U.S. domestic law, such as the War Crimes Act of 1996 and the 
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prescribes the requisite authority and conditions under which 
a detaining power may hold individuals in an IAC or NIAC. 
B. The President Can Detain Terrorist Adversaries
Under the LOAC Governing IACs and NIACs
Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions serves to 
trigger all of the provisions and protections of the conventions during 
any armed conflict that arises among nations, regardless if war has 
only been declared by one state.42 In conflicts defined as IACs, 
Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention confers authority upon a 
nation to detain combatants and Article 42 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention grants detention authority over civilians.43 Furthermore, 
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
(AP I) prescribes the treatment of detainees in IACs, requiring that 
“[a]ny person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the 
armed conflict be informed promptly . . . of the reasons why these 
measures have been taken.”44 Article 75 of AP I also states that 
detainees who have not been captured for penal offences must “be 
released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon 
as the circumstances justifying the . . . detention . . . have ceased to 
exist.”45 Thus, it is evident that during an IAC, a nation state is 
entitled to detain a belligerent adversary for so long as the state 
deems the belligerent a threat to the nation’s security.  
Given that NIACs are typically civil wars waged within a 
sovereign nation, the state likely resorts to its domestic legal regime 
to punish or detain the insurgent group.46 Thus, only Common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (CA3)47 and Additional 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. Oona Hathaway et al., The Power to Detain: Detention of 
Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 153–54 (2013). 
42. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
GC-I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85 [hereinafter GC-II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC-III]; GC-IV, supra note 37, art.3. 
43. GC-III, supra note 42, art. 21; GC-IV, supra note 37, art. 42.
44. Protocol I, supra note 40, art 75.
45. Id.
46. Glazier, supra note 25, at 992.
47. GC-I, supra note 42, art. 3; GC-II, supra note 42, art.3; GC-III, supra note 42, art. 3;
GC-IV, supra note 37, art. 3. 
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Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP II)48 apply when the 
armed conflict takes place in the territory of a single nation and is not 
international in nature. CA3 grants basic protections to persons who 
are no longer actively participating in hostilities and prohibits, 
among other things, “the passage of sentences . . . without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all 
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.”49 Articles 4 and 5 of AP II expand on the 
protections promulgated by CA3 by setting forth “fundamental 
guarantees” similar to those described in Article 75 of AP I.50 Article 
6 of AP II also states that “[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in 
power shall endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to 
persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those 
deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, 
whether they are interned or detained.”51 These provisions rely on 
the assumption that the sovereign state retains the authority to punish 
or detain a person in a NIAC for any reason related to the conflict, 
not just active participation in hostilities. 
Thus, under the LOAC governing both IACs and NIACs, the 
nation state reserves the right to detain whomever it views as a 
threat. Unfortunately, however, the present armed conflict has defied 
characterization as either an IAC or NIAC. While the Bush 
administration operated on the premise that the “war on terror” was 
international in nature such that any terrorist could be deemed a 
combatant and subject to preventive detention, the Supreme Court 
plurality opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld52 appeared to invoke CA3 
to govern what could only be labeled a non-international conflict, 
demonstrating the lack of consistency regarding the classification of 
this armed conflict.53  
As mentioned above, a sovereign state engaged in an IAC 
retains authority to capture and detain combatants and civilians 
48. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 438 
[hereinafter Protocol II]. 
49. GC-I, supra note 42, art. 3.
50. Protocol I, supra note 40, art. 75; Protocol II, supra note 48, arts. 4–5.
51. Protocol II, supra note 48, art. 6.
52. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
53. Id. at 629–31 (declining to decide whether the conflict would be characterized as an IAC
or a NIAC, yet determining it would be governed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions). 
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wherever the individual is captured. However, the United States has 
not expressly adopted this classification, and has instead adopted an 
“overseas contingency operations” approach, in which certain 
countries have been officially identified as enemy-occupied 
territory.54 Moreover, President Obama has declared that he 
will interpret the AUMF in a manner “informed by law of war 
principles.”55  
Thus, even if the current conflict were characterized as an IAC, 
in a situation where a U.S. civilian has been captured domestically 
for alleged acts of terrorism, the U.S. would be bound by Article 42 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention to ensure that the detention was 
“absolutely necessary” to the security of the detaining power.56 This 
language warrants an inquiry under domestic law as to the propriety 
of the detention, triggering the additional layer of protections 
guaranteed by domestic law. Ultimately, classifying the current 
conflict as an IAC would not, by itself, resolve the question of 
whether indefinite administrative detention is permissible when the 
individual purported to be detained is a U.S. citizen who has been 
captured away from the theater of war.  
Another justification for detaining citizens within the United 
States might be established by extending the theater of war to include 
the United States. Declaring a state of war within the coterminous 
States might be more consistent with a non-international 
characterization of the conflict. Furthermore, relying on the fact that 
NIACs necessarily invoke domestic law to provide the source of a 
sovereign’s detention authority, several high-ranking government 
officials would argue that citizen detention is already within the 
scope of the president’s Article II war powers.57 On the other hand, 
54. See Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Transmitting a Supplemental
Appropriations Request for Ongoing Military, Diplomatic, and Intelligence Operations, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 471 (Apr. 9, 2009); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Global Deployments of 
United States Combat-Equipped Armed Forces, 1 PUB. PAPERS 833 (June 15, 2009). 
55. Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative
to Detainees Held at Guantánamo Bay at 1, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. 
No. 08-0442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum Re Guantánamo Bay], available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf. 
56. GC-IV, supra note 37, art. 42.
57. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
plurality utterly fails to account for the Government’s compelling interests and for our own 
institutional inability to weigh competing concerns correctly.”); 157 CONG. REC. S8,045 (daily 
ed. Nov. 30, 2011) (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham) (“It is not unfair to make an American 
citizen account for the fact that they decided to help al-Qaida to kill us all and hold them as long 
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others would require significantly more than an invocation of 
inherent executive authority to detain citizens without allowing them 
access to the courts.58  
Therefore, without a clear characterization of the conflict as a 
NIAC or IAC, it is uncertain which laws govern detention authority 
over citizens on U.S. territory. To make matters more complicated, 
the LOAC provisions regarding a belligerent sovereign’s ability to 
detain its own citizens are subject to varying interpretations. Some 
scholars believe that executive orders of detention in NIACs are 
authorized to the same extent as they are in IACs.59 Others would 
argue that IAC rules apply when belligerency can be attached to a 
party during a NIAC, but otherwise, domestic law and the 
protections of human rights law govern.60 In any case, regardless of 
whether the conflict is classified as an IAC or NIAC, President 
Obama’s statement evidences an intent to rely primarily on domestic 
law, calling for an analysis of how the domestic law framework 
addresses the issue of the indefinite detention of citizens on 
American soil. 
C. The President Likely Does Not Have Constitutional or
Statutory Authority to Indefinitely Detain U.S. Citizens
Captured Away from the Theater of War 
In light of the Obama administration’s stance that it can only 
“analogize” law of war principles to its interpretation and 
as it takes to find intelligence about what may be coming next.”); Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, 
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-6396) (“It would blink reality to conclude 
that the Congress that enacted the AUMF on September 18, 2001, wanted to authorize capture on 
a foreign battlefield and detention in the United States, but not capture and detention in the 
United States . . . .”). 
58. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 573–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Hamdi is entitled to a habeas
decree requiring his release unless (1) criminal proceedings are promptly brought, or (2) Congress 
has suspended the writ of habeas corpus. . . . [The AUMF] is not remotely a congressional 
suspension of the writ, and no one claims that it is.”); id. at 544–45 (Souter, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“[E]ven if history spared us the cautionary example of the internments in 
World War II . . . there would be a compelling reason to read § 4001(a) to demand manifest 
authority to detain before detention is authorized.”); Memorandum Re Guantánamo Bay, supra 
note 56, at 1 (basing the president’s authority to detain persons at Guantánamo on the AUMF). 
59. See Robert Chesney, Who May be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens,
52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 796 (2011); Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 
103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 50 (2009). 
60. See Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of US Practice Relating to ‘Enemy Combatants’, 10 Y.B.
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 232, 237–41 (2009). 
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implementation of military operations under the AUMF,61 it appears 
that the LOAC framework alone does not adequately address the 
issue of a sovereign’s power to detain its citizens in a NIAC; thus, it 
is necessary to turn the focus inward to domestic law governing 
citizen detention during armed conflicts. 
 Article II of the Constitution declares that “[t]he President 
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy” and has power 
to handle the nation’s foreign affairs and ensure all laws are executed 
faithfully.62 The great extent of the president’s foreign affairs power 
was described by the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.63 The president has also been described as the 
“sole organ” in international relations, suggesting that the executive 
branch is vested with plenary and exclusive war powers.64 Justice 
Jackson’s well-known concurring opinion in Youngstown has 
influenced the analysis of executive power in times of war and has 
since supported the conclusion that any congressional authorization 
of the president’s foreign affairs policies places the president in a 
zone of maximum power, where his acts warrant minimal judicial 
scrutiny.65 Even Congress’s reticence could be interpreted as 
acquiescence to an executive mandate.66 Jackson called this the 
“zone of twilight” and reasoned that only when the Court determined 
the president relied upon his executive authority as 
commander-in-chief to accomplish purely domestic objectives could 
the judicial branch exert any limitations on the president’s war 
powers.67 Finally, Jackson described a third zone, where Congress 
61. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks on the Obama Administration
and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/ 
139119.htm (addressing the need to translate principles from the laws of war governing IACs to 
apply to the current conflict against a nontraditional enemy). 
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
63. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
64. Id. at 319–20 (“It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority 
plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the 
federal government in the field of international relations . . . .”). 
65. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring). 
66. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the Court interpreted Congress’s
silence towards the president’s political decision to terminate all civil claims against Iranian 
parties as acquiescence of the president’s acts. Id. at 678–84. 
67. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645–46 (reasoning that the president cannot use “his
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force . . . when it is turned inward, not 
because of rebellion but because of a lawful economic struggle between industry and labor”). 
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had acted to expressly prohibit presidential action, and where the 
judicial branch is capable of higher scrutiny of executive acts, even 
those exercised in the name of the president’s war powers.68 
To determine whether the president’s detention authority is a 
war power exclusive to the executive branch requires an examination 
of the history of citizen detention in the United States. The first 
notable cases addressing detention of American citizens arose out of 
the internment of Japanese Americans in World War II. In 
Hirabayashi v. United States,69 the Supreme Court defined the 
national government’s war power as one that “is not restricted to the 
winning of victories in the field” but “extends to every matter and 
activity so related to war as substantially to affect its conduct and 
progress . . . .”70 The Court also recognized that this express grant of 
power in the Constitution meant that both the president and Congress 
must enjoy broad discretion to execute their war powers.71 Noting 
that Congress had passed the Act of 194272 ratifying executive orders 
that established a curfew for Hirabayashi and other citizens of 
Japanese ancestry following the attacks on Pearl Harbor,73 the 
Supreme Court found that the legislative and executive branches’ 
actions fell squarely within the boundaries of the war power, 
warranting substantial deference by the judicial branch.74 
Drawing on its reasoning in Hirabayashi, the Court 
subsequently upheld the constitutionality of the executive orders 
mandating the internment of Japanese citizens in Korematsu v. 
United States.75 Justice Jackson, one of three vigorous dissenters, 
warned that while military orders may last only as long as the 
military exigency, judicial construction and approval of such orders 
“validated the principle . . . of transplanting American citizens.”76 
Jackson understood the inherent danger in permitting a single 
68. Id.
69. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
70. Id. at 93.
71. Id.
72. Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Areas or Zones, Restrictions, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173
(1942). 
73. Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938–43).
74. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 91–92.
75. 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944).
76. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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incident to become an enduring principle of law, a doctrine that is 
reinforced over time and expanded to cover novel situations.77 
Seeking to settle the issue on citizen detention, Congress enacted 
the Non-Detention Act nearly thirty years after Korematsu was 
decided, to prohibit executive detention of American citizens without 
congressional authorization.78 Congress’s intent was clear: to prevent 
the president from exceeding his expansive executive power and 
once again ordering the detention of American citizens whose 
disloyalty or dangerousness had not been verified.79 The 
Non-Detention Act repealed the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, 
legislation passed during the Red Scare of the Cold War that 
permitted the president to declare a state of emergency and order ad 
hoc internment of persons who were suspected of engaging in 
sabotage or espionage.80 One commentator notes that Congress, by 
passing and subsequently repealing legislation dealing with 
preventive detention of citizens on U.S. soil, indicated that the 
president must not have been considered to already have that 
authority, at least during times of peace.81  
It is not clear whether Congress intended to include such 
detention authority over American citizens detained away from the 
theater of war when it passed the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF).82 The AUMF granted the president power to act 
against the “nations, organizations, or persons” connected with the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11.83 A plurality of the Supreme 
77. Id. (“The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”). 
78. Non-Detention Act, supra note 23.
79. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718–19 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the
legislative history of the Non-Detention Act supports a reading of the Non-Detention Act as 
prohibiting both military and civilian detentions), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); see also Lindsey O. 
Graham & Michael D. Tomatz, NDAA 2012: Congress and Consensus on Enemy Detention, 69 
A.F. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013) (noting that though the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s 
holding in Padilla for lack of jurisdiction, Justice Stevens’s dissent, joined by three justices, 
indicated support for the Second Circuit’s finding that the Non-Detention Act prohibited U.S. 
citizen detention without an act of Congress). 
80. Emergency Detention Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 811, repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85
Stat. 348 (1971). 
81. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42337, DETENTION OF U.S. PERSONS 
AS ENEMY BELLIGERENTS 30 (2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42337.pdf 
(suggesting that the president might not have held “the constitutional power to declare such 
individuals to be enemy combatants subject to detention under the law of war on the basis of an 
authorization to use force or declaration of war, except perhaps very narrow circumstances”). 
82. AUMF, supra note 7.
83. Id.
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Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld84 interpreted the AUMF’s broad 
authorization for the president to take “‘all necessary and appropriate 
force’ against ‘nations, organizations, or persons’ associated with the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks” as an implicit grant of power 
to indefinitely detain enemy combatants regardless of citizenship 
status.85 
However, Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, did not 
address whether the same principles would apply to American 
citizens detained in non-battlefield conditions, or if the president has 
explicit constitutional authority to classify an American citizen as an 
enemy combatant.86 Dissenting from the plurality, Justice Souter, 
joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that the unambiguous prohibition 
of citizen detention in the Non-Detention Act called for a clear 
congressional statement to authorize the internment of American 
citizens, wherever they are captured.87 Noting that the AUMF does 
not expressly incorporate the word detention, Justice Souter argued 
that “there is no reason to think Congress might have perceived any 
need to augment Executive power to deal with dangerous citizens 
within the United States, given the well-stocked statutory arsenal of 
defined criminal offenses covering the gamut of actions that a citizen 
sympathetic to terrorists might commit.”88 Scholars have also 
weighed in on this issue regarding whether the AUMF would suffice 
as a clear congressional statement authorizing citizen detention by 
suggesting that government-mandated detention of citizens within 
the United States could indeed be considered a violation of the 
Non-Detention Act.89 Consequently, whether the AUMF constituted 
such an express sanction of citizens captured on American soil is a 
question that has yet to be settled.90 
84. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
85. Id. at 518–19 (quoting AUMF, supra note 7); Colby P. Horowitz, Note, Creating a More
Meaningful Detention Statute: Lessons Learned from Hedges v. Obama, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2853, 2859–60 (2013). 
86. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–17.
87. Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 547.
89. See ELSEA, supra note 81, at 36–37; Sarah H. Cleveland, Hamdi Meets Youngstown:
Justice Jackson’s Wartime Security Jurisprudence and the Detention of “Enemy Combatants”, 68 
ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1139–40 (2005). 
90. See Robert Chesney, Congress, the Courts, and Detention of Americans under the
AUMF/NDAA, LAWFARE (Dec. 2, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/congr
ess-the-courts-and-detention-of-americans-under-the-aumfndaa/. 
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The 2012 version of the NDAA provides some clarification 
regarding the detention policies in the current conflict. The NDAA’s 
predominant purpose is to allocate funds to the Department of 
Defense for the execution of various military activities.91 Buried in 
the more than three thousand provisions regulating the fiscal affairs 
of the military are two sections implicating civil liberties in the 
current conflict.92 
In fact, sections 1021 and 1022 constitute the first codification 
of executive detention authority during the current conflict.93 Section 
1021 mentions “covered persons,” individuals whose activities or 
affiliation with terrorist networks could potentially subject them to 
indefinite detention without access to courts or lawyers.94 Section 
1031, a provision in an earlier Senate version of the NDAA, removed 
a limitation on detention for citizens and lawful resident aliens,95 
inciting concerns that the NDAA could be read to authorize detention 
of Americans without trial or conviction of any charge.96 Statements 
made during conference on section 1031 reveal that several senators 
fully intended the provision to maximize the president’s war powers 
on American soil over American citizens who were deemed a danger 
to national security.97  
91. It is interesting that Congress decided to include the detention provisions at issue in the
NDAA, given that the statute’s main purpose is to regulate and finance military operations. This 
might lend itself to an interpretation of the NDAA’s detention sections as a legislative 
afterthought, but the lengthy congressional debate over the provisions and President Obama’s 
threatened veto of the entire bill without an amendment of the detention provisions to provide 
some protection for citizens indicate that Congress had intended to codify the president’s 
detention authority. See NDAA, supra note 11, at § 1 (stating that the statute’s purpose is “to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2012 for military activities of the Department of 
Defense . . . .”); see also Recent Legislation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1876 (2012) (discussing the 
tension between the legislative and executive branches over certain controversial provisions of 
the NDAA, including sections 1021 and 1022). 
92. NDAA, supra note 11, at §§ 1021–22.
93. ELSEA, supra note 81, at 1.
94. NDAA, supra note 11, at § 1021(b).
95. S. 1253, 112th Cong. § 1031 (as reported by S. Comm. on Armed Services, June 22,
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s1253rs/pdf/BILLS-112s1253rs.pdf 
(“[Section 1031] would authorize the [military] to detain unprivileged enemy belligerents 
captured in the course of hostilities authorized by the [AUMF].”). 
96. See Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 184 & n.83 (2d Cir. 2013).
97. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S7,941 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2011) (statement of Sen. Rand
Paul); see also 112 CONG. REC. S8,096–103 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Graham) 
(“It has always been the law that when an American citizen takes up arms and joins the enemy, 
that is not a criminal act; that is an act of war. They can be held and interrogated about what they 
did and what they know because that keeps us safe. If we take that off the table, with homegrown 
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Senator Dianne Feinstein’s attempts to safeguard against such an 
interpretation resulted in a “compromise amendment” that ultimately 
became section 1021(e) of the NDAA.98 Much of the controversy 
surrounding 1021(e) arises from the fact that it does not expressly 
exempt U.S. citizens from potential indefinite detention, unlike its 
sister provision, section 1022. Section 1022 states “detainable 
persons are not just detainable in theory, but affirmatively must be 
subject to military detention”99 and was amended to exclude U.S. 
citizens from mandatory detention.100 In light of such explicit 
exemption in section 1022, section 1021(e) could be construed as 
“provid[ing] clearer statutory authority to encompass citizens 
abroad” or citizens whose combatant status is disputed.101 Section 
1021(e) embodied the Senate’s agreement to disagree on whether the 
Supreme Court’s narrow decision in Hamdi could be interpreted as 
limiting detention without trial to U.S. citizens arrested on a foreign 
battlefield or sanctioning a broader authority to detain American 
citizens captured domestically.102 The existence of congressional 
statements regarding detention of U.S. citizens strongly suggests that 
Congress contemplated limits on the president’s constitutional power 
in the final version of the NDAA that constrained him from ordering 
military detentions of U.S. citizens found on U.S. soil independent of 
legislative action.103 
Both the AUMF and the NDAA statutes relating to detention are 
admittedly vague. The AUMF lacks specificity and commentators 
have questioned whether it is still as relevant to the conflict as it was 
when it was passed over a decade ago.104 Thus, the NDAA provides 
terrorism becoming the greatest threat we face, we will have done something no other Congress 
has done in any other war.”). 
98. See Hedges, 724 F.3d at 185; 157 CONG. REC. S7,7161, S7,745 (daily ed. Nov. 17,
2011); 157 CONG. REC. S8,094–122, S8,125 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011). 
99. Robert Chesney, Does the NDAA Authorize Detention of US Citizens?, LAWFARE
(Dec. 1, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/does-the-ndaa-authorize 
-detention-of-us-citizens/.
100. NDAA, supra note 11, at § 1022.
101. Robert Chesney, Clarification: NDAA Could Still Be Read to Apply to Citizens Seized
Abroad, LAWFARE (Dec. 9, 2011, 12:34 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/ clarification
-ndaa-could-still-be-read-to-apply-to-citizens-if-seized-abroad/.
102. Hedges, 724 F.3d at 185 (quoting 157 CONG. REC. S8,122 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Feinstein)). 
103. See ELSEA, supra note 81, at 37.
104. See Beau D. Barnes, Reauthorizing the “War on Terror”: The Legal and Policy
Implications of the AUMF’s Coming Obsolescence, 211 MIL. L. REV. 57 (2012); David S. Kris, 
Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1, 64 (2011); 
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the most up-to-date assessment on congressional attitudes toward 
presidential wartime authority. It prescribes parameters on how and 
when the government can detain what it terms “covered persons,” a 
neutral term for the now-defunct “enemy combatant” designation.105 
With regards to citizens, however, it is silent. Congress’s reticence in 
this area is not insignificant; previous congressional acts in the area 
of citizen detention support the notion that the president’s 
commander-in-chief detention powers are not unlimited.106 
Therefore, it would not be inaccurate to surmise that the NDAA 
failed to grant the authority necessary to permit the president to 
subject citizens suspected of terrorist activities to indefinite 
detention. 
III. CITIZEN COMBATANT CASES: HAMDI, PADILLA, AND HEDGES
Given that subsection (e) of section 1021 effectively granted the
president no additional authority over the fate of citizens captured on 
U.S. territory, it is necessary to determine what previous relevant 
cases have held. Unfortunately, there exists little consensus within 
the courts as to the limits on the president’s powers over citizens 
detained in the current conflict. Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla’s 
protracted litigation demonstrate that courts do not hold consistent 
views on how and when to defer to congressional and executive 
action when it comes to detaining Americans whose terrorist 
adversary status is in dispute. 
A. Hamdi: The President Is Permitted to Detain
Citizens Captured on a Foreign Battlefield
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen who immigrated to Saudi 
Arabia in the early 1980s, was captured on an Afghan battlefield in 
2001.107 The government deemed him an “enemy combatant,” 
claiming that “this status justifie[d] holding him in the United States 
indefinitely[,] without formal charges or proceedings.”108 A plurality 
James B. Stein & Miriam R. Estrin, Harmonizing Policy and Principle: A Hybrid Model for 
Counterterrorism, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 161, 206 (2014) (recommending that the 
AUMF be reviewed to “match the current threats the United States faces against regional 
organizations that may have, at best, an attenuated relationship to al Qaeda”). 
105. NDAA, supra note 11, at §§ 1021–22; AUMF, supra note 7.
106. See supra Part II.C.
107. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
108. Id. at 510–11.
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of the Court, ignoring the issue of whether the government’s 
definition of “enemy combatant” was a legitimate classification in 
wartime,109 recognized that Congress, through the AUMF, had 
authorized the “use [of] all necessary and appropriate force” against 
any party associated with the attacks on 9/11.110 The plurality 
concluded that the joint resolution necessarily granted the president 
authority to detain individuals labeled “enemy combatants” as “a 
fundamental and accepted . . . incident of waging war.”111 
Relying on Quirin, the plurality recognized that “[t]here is no 
bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy 
combatant.”112 The plurality agreed that Hamdi’s citizenship did not 
preclude him from being detained as an “enemy combatant,” because 
the purpose of such “detention [was] to prevent a combatant’s return 
to the battlefield[,]”113 and it was clear that “Hamdi [had been] 
captured in a zone of active combat in a theater of war.”114 Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg disagreed with the plurality that the AUMF had 
authorized detention.115 According to Justice Souter, the AUMF, 
which lacked any explicit mention of detention, did not provide the 
clear congressional authorization necessary to override the 
Non-Detention Act and permit the executive to detain citizens 
without charge or trial.116 
Upon concluding that Hamdi’s detention as an “enemy 
combatant” was authorized, Justice O’Connor applied the 
Mathews v. Eldridge117 analysis, what she described as the “ordinary 
mechanism [used] . . . to ensure that a citizen is not ‘deprived of life, 
liberty, or process without due process of law.’”118 In doing so, 
Justice O’Connor helped to define the Court’s role as a safeguard of 
fundamental rights. She recognized that Hamdi’s private interest was 
a fundamental “interest in being free from physical detention by 
one’s own government[,]”119 and that the government’s interest in 
109. See id. at 516–17.
110. Id. at 518.
111. Id. at 519.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003).
115. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 540–41 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. See id. at 545–52.
117. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
118. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528–29 (majority opinion) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. 5).
119. Id. at 539.
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preventing an enemy from returning to the battlefield without the 
hindrance and distraction of litigation was a “weighty and sensitive” 
justification for limiting judicial review over wartime detentions.120 
When weighed against the third prong of the Mathews test, Justice 
O’Connor concluded that the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
Hamdi’s liberty was too high to justify sacrificing the “[n]ation’s 
commitment to due process” and the indelible value of American 
citizenship.121 She found that a citizen-detainee deserved notice of 
the facts used to classify him as an “enemy combatant” and an 
opportunity to appear before a neutral decision maker to challenge 
those factual allegations.122 Rather than go through a separate 
hearing to determine whether he was an “enemy combatant,” 
however, Hamdi agreed to renounce his U.S. citizenship and was 
repatriated to Saudi Arabia.123 
The plurality in Hamdi interpreted the AUMF as granting 
authority to the executive to detain U.S. citizens indefinitely as 
“enemy combatants,” but agreed that this authorization only applies 
in narrow circumstances where the citizen is captured on foreign 
battlefields while actively engaged in hostilities against the United 
States.124 The Court, thus, did not address the separate issue of 
whether citizens detained on American soil can be held indefinitely 
as “enemy combatants.”125 It allowed this issue to remain 
unanswered by rejecting Hamdi’s companion case, Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla,126 for procedural reasons. 
B. Padilla: Does the President Actually Have the Authority
 to Detain Citizens Arrested on American Soil? 
Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen detained on American soil for 
allegedly working with al-Qaeda to detonate a “dirty bomb” in the 
U.S.,127 spent more than three years detained in a naval brig before
120. Id. at 531.
121. Id. at 532–33.
122. Id.
123. Tung Yin, Enemies of the State: Rational Classification in the War on Terrorism, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 903, 910 (2007). 
124. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510–21.
125. See Hafetz, supra note 6, at 37–38.
126. 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
127. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 701 (2d Cir. 2003).
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he was transferred into the criminal justice system.128 Padilla’s 
capture in the country was crucial to his case. The Second Circuit, 
relying on Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown,129 found 
that the president “lack[ed] inherent constitutional authority as 
Commander in Chief to detain American citizens on American soil 
outside a zone of combat.”130 Additionally, the court found that 
Congress’s AUMF did not provide the specific congressional 
authorization necessary to sanction executive detention of American 
citizens on American soil in light of the Non-Detention Act expressly 
prohibiting such authority.131 
However, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s 
ruling on the basis that Padilla’s claim was procedurally barred for 
lack of jurisdiction,132 effectively avoiding “deciding the lawfulness 
of a far more expansive use of enemy combatant detention authority” 
under the AUMF.133 Padilla refiled his habeas petition in the proper 
jurisdiction, and the district court echoed the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning that, because Padilla had been detained on American soil, 
his capture was not deemed a “necessary and appropriate” measure 
under the AUMF.134 The court held that without explicit 
congressional authorization to overcome the Non-Detention Act’s 
prohibition against detention of U.S. citizens, Padilla could not be 
legally detained.135 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
ruling.136 The court summarily rejected Padilla’s argument that 
detention of U.S. citizens required a “clear statement” from Congress 
128. Warren Richey, U.S. Turning Over Secret Files to Lawyer for Jose Padilla: What That
Could Mean, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice
/2014/0212/US-turning-over-secret-files-to-lawyer-for-Jose-Padilla-what-that-could-mean. 
129. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 711; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635–38 (1952). 
130. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 712.
131. Id. at 723–24.
132. The Court reversed the Second Circuit’s judgment that Padilla could assert a writ for
habeas corpus in the District Court for the Southern District of New York because only the 
district where he was detained had jurisdiction over him. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 
(2004). 
133. Hafetz, supra note 6, at 38 (“[The Court’s] rationale eviscerated any meaningful
distinction between detaining a Taliban soldier seized a battlefield in Afghanistan or an alleged 
al-Qaeda agent arrested in the United States.”). 
134. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 686 (D.S.C. 2005).
135. Id. at 685–89.
136. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 2005).
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according to another WWII internment case, Ex parte Endo,137 in 
which the Court stated that it was limited by the clear language of a 
wartime statute to find implied executive powers.138 The Fourth 
Circuit reasoned that the Endo Court held that a detention authority 
exists, even though the Act of 1942 made no reference to 
detention.139 Finally, the circuit court held that even if a clear 
statement was required, the AUMF constituted a sufficiently clear 
statement where its purpose to prevent future terrorist acts applied 
unmistakably to detaining someone like Jose Padilla, who had 
allegedly come to the United States intending to commit terrorist 
acts.140 
Three months later, the government filed criminal charges 
against Padilla and requested that the Fourth Circuit vacate its 
decision.141 However, the circuit denied the government’s motion, 
determining that the issue of whether the AUMF granted the 
president power to detain “enemy combatants” on American soil 
indefinitely was of “such especial national importance as to warrant 
final consideration by [the Supreme C]ourt, even if only by denial of 
further review . . . .”142 Indeed, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 
but three Justices would have granted the petition.143 Justice 
Ginsburg wrote a dissent, asserting that the question whether “the 
President [has] authority to imprison indefinitely a United States 
citizen arrested on United States soil distant from a zone of combat 
based on an executive declaration that the citizen was . . . ‘an enemy 
combatant’” was one “of profound importance to the Nation” that 
should have already been addressed.144 The enactment of an explicit 
detention provision in the NDAA, however, raised a host of 
questions regarding the scope of the president’s detention authority. 
137. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
138. Padilla, 423 F.3d at 395.
139. Id. (quoting Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301 (1944)).
140. Id. at 395–96.
141. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 2005).
142. Id. at 583.
143. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
144. Id. at 1651 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 455 (2004)).
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C. The Hedges Plaintiffs: Can the President Detain Citizens on
American Soil for “Substantially Supporting” 
 “Associated Forces”?145 
Seven notable writers and activists challenged NDAA’s section 
1021, claiming that it incorporated broader language as to the 
definition of an “enemy combatant.”146 The plaintiffs, Pulitzer 
Prize-winning journalist Christopher Hedges and other prominent 
U.S. citizens along with foreign political correspondents and activists 
whose work linked them to members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
information intimately connected to those terrorist networks, sought 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief from section 1021 on the 
grounds that it violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights.147 
Several plaintiffs expressed fears that their work with organizations 
such as WikiLeaks and their support of certain activist associations 
could implicate them under section 1021’s military detention 
clause.148 They testified that the statutory language was 
disconcertingly vague as to whether their work could be construed as 
substantially supporting associated forces of al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban, and that they had significantly curtailed or altered their 
usual scope of activities to avoid falling within section 1021’s 
reach.149 
District court Judge Katherine Forrest agreed that certain terms 
in section 1021(b)(2)—“covered person,” “substantially,” and 
“directly”—lacked sufficient clarity such that they did not satisfy the 
Due Process requirement of notifying an individual of “what conduct 
might cause him or her to run afoul of [section] 1021.”150 Thus, 
holding that section 1021 was not a mere affirmation of the AUMF, 
Judge Forrest ultimately granted plaintiffs’ claims for preliminary 
and permanent injunctive relief.151 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
vacated Judge Forrest’s permanent injunction of section 1021.152 It 
held that the domestic plaintiffs did not establish standing because 
145. NDAA, supra note 11, at § 1021.
146. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331(KBF), 2012 WL 1721124, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 16,
2012). 
147. Id.
148. Id. at *6–11.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *23.
151. Id. at *28; Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting
motion for permanent injunction). 
152. Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2013).
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“[s]ection 1021 says nothing at all about the President’s authority to 
detain American citizens.”153 The court, therefore, declined to 
address the merits of the constitutional claims.154 The Second Circuit 
went on to examine the language of the statute to determine if section 
1021 actually expanded the executive detention authority.155 Holding 
that section 1021(b)(2) merely clarified the AUMF’s previous 
authority on detention of organizations,156 the court accepted the 
government’s position “that the statute does next to nothing at all” 
regarding the president’s detention of U.S. citizens or individuals 
captured on U.S. soil.157 The court relied on the legislative history of 
section 1021(e), Senator Feinstein’s “compromise amendment,”158 to 
determine that it was merely “a ‘truce’ that ensured that—as to those 
who are covered by section 1021(e)—courts would decide detention 
authority based not on section 1021(b), but on what the law 
previously had provided in the absence of that enactment.”159 
The Second Circuit engaged in a thorough and accurate statutory 
interpretation analysis of section 1021 in the Hedges case to 
determine that it was not an expansion of the president’s war 
powers.160 The court reached a legally justified result, but deigned to 
clarify that the “existing law or authorities” on the subject of citizens 
detained on U.S. territory is neither clear nor consistent.161 
According to the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Padilla, Congress’s 
joint resolution to authorize military force subsequently permits the 
president to detain citizens regardless of where they are captured.162 
This interpretation of the AUMF is not without its critics, since it 
153. Id. at 174.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 189.
156. The court came to this conclusion even though the NDAA added language not present in
the AUMF. Id. (“While Section 1021(b)(1) mimics language in the AUMF, Section 1021(b)(2) 
adds language absent from the AUMF.”). 
157. Id. at 173.
158. Id. at 192.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 182–87, 189–93.
161. NDAA, supra note 11, at § 1021(e); see Steve Vladeck, The Problematic NDAA: On
Clear Statements and Non-Battlefield Detention, LAWFARE (Dec. 13, 2011, 12:06 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/the-problematic-ndaa-on-clear-statements-and-non 
-battlefield-detention/.
162. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 393–94 (4th Cir. 2005).
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appears to contradict Congress’s intent to prohibit citizen detention 
on American soil via the Non-Detention Act of 1971.163 
Despite the voluminous decisions amassed in the litigation of 
the citizen cases, only the Hamdi plurality’s narrow conclusion with 
regards to citizens actively engaged in hostilities on foreign 
battlefields remains as binding precedent on all courts. The Second 
and Fourth Circuits have come to opposite conclusions about 
whether the AUMF grants the president the authority to subject 
citizens captured on U.S. soil to indefinite military detention.164 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has shied away from deciding what 
is the president’s inherent authority to detain citizens arrested on 
American soil.165 The lack of settled precedent raises concerns about 
how courts will read the AUMF and NDAA to apply it to future 
citizen combatant cases that may arise in the current conflict or any 
other conflict that takes place outside U.S. borders. 
IV. APPLYING THE YOUNGSTOWN FRAMEWORK AND THE CLEAR
STATEMENT RULE TO EXECUTIVE DETENTION AUTHORITY
In light of the unsettled issue of citizen detention, it is 
disappointing that the NDAA failed to clarify the boundaries of the 
executive detention authority over citizens captured on American 
soil. Congress, faced with President Obama’s threatened veto, ended 
the standoff over whether the indefinite detention provision in 
section 1021 would extend to U.S. citizens by reaching a 
compromise between those senators who wanted to expand detention 
of “covered persons” to include citizens captured on American soil 
and those who wanted to prohibit such detention.166 Rather than 
choose one interpretation over another, Congress punted the issue 
over to the judicial referees of statutory interpretation.167 The 
inconsistent holdings of the Padilla case in the Second and Fourth 
Circuits, however, demonstrate the difficulty that lower courts have 
already experienced in attempting to resolve the issue of whether the 
163. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 570 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718–24 (2d Cir. 2003). 
164. See supra Part III.B.
165. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 570.
166. See supra Part II.C.
167. Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 157 CONG. REC.
S8,122 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)). 
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AUMF authorizes indefinite detention of American citizens detained 
on American soil. 
By refusing to issue a clear statement against indefinite military 
detention of citizens, Congress could be viewed as implicitly 
endorsing the president’s power to subject citizens to military 
detention regardless of whether they have been accurately designated 
as a terrorist adversary. Indeed, some senators have vehemently 
expressed the viewpoint that nothing stands in the way of terrorists 
carrying out future attacks on the coterminous United States, 
thrusting the U.S. into the theater of war.168 In particular, Senator 
Lindsey Graham’s statements that no U.S. citizen alleged to be a 
terrorist adversary could justifiably expect a right to counsel sparked 
intense debate on the Senate floor.169 
Senator Graham’s assertions, though volatile, subscribe to 
long-standing tradition and precedent that establish the president’s 
robust authority as commander-in-chief. It is of no moment then, that 
even fundamental due process rights are subject to restriction in 
times of war.170 However, the internment of Japanese-American 
citizens during WWII is a cautionary tale of how rapidly key 
constitutional rights can fall to the wayside when a nation is blinded 
by fear. The Korematsu decision that upheld the government’s 
actions serves as a compelling reminder of when too much judicial 
deference to executive authority in times of war yields regrettable 
results that are not easily reversed.171 Therefore, war powers must 
168. 157 CONG. REC. S7,949 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2011) (statement of Sen. Levin) (“Al-Qaida
is at war with us. They brought that war to our shores. This is not just a foreign war. They 
brought that war to our shores on 9/11.”); id. at S7,954 (statement of Sen. Lieberman) (“A nation 
at war that seizes those who have declared themselves to be part of enemy forces and have 
attempted to attack the American people, or America, should be treated as enemy combatants, as 
prisoners of war, according to the law of war. To me, that is a matter of principle.”). 
169. 
If you are an American citizen and you betray your country, you are going to be held in 
military custody and . . . [y]ou are not going to be given a lawyer if our national 
security interests dictate that you not be given a lawyer and go into the criminal justice 
system because we are not fighting a crime, we are fighting a war. 
 (statement of Sen. Graham). 
170. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2007). 
171. Forty years would pass before Fred Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi were permitted
to have their cases reopened and their convictions overturned. See Brief for Karen Korematsu, et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170 (2013) (Nos. 
12-3176, 12-3644). Nearly fifty years after defending the internment policy in Korematsu, the
Solicitor General issued an official apology for the office’s role in upholding the government-
sanctioned internment of Japanese-American citizens. Neal Katyal, Acting Solicitor General of
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only be exercised commensurate with the exigency and gravity of the 
threat. Justice Jackson declared that “the bulwark of liberty in the 
Constitution [i]s process.”172 As the interpreters of what process is 
due to a particular individual, the judiciary, are the watchmen of this 
bulwark, uniquely positioned to sound the alarm the moment a 
barrier has been breached.173 Their role becomes more pronounced as 
this armed conflict winds down, where excesses of the executive 
must be properly curbed and a specter of fear does not continue to 
compromise the nation’s most highly coveted asset: the fundamental 
civil liberties guaranteed by due process to citizens.174 
So what stands in the way of a repeat of the large-scale 
derogation of constitutional rights that occurred immediately after 
the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon in 2001 and the 
attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941? Indeed, one might interpret 
Congress’s inability to come to a consensus regarding the matter of 
citizen detention as a presumption against military detention of 
citizens captured within the United States. Conversely, it could also 
be construed as a foothold for future executive administrations to 
justify the deprivation of physical liberty without due process for a 
disfavored group of citizens. President Obama’s signing statement 
regarding the NDAA mollified to some extent the concerns that 
section 1021 would authorize indefinite military detention of U.S. 
citizens away from the theater of war.175 President Obama openly 
admitted that he had “serious reservations” about the provisions that 
dealt with “detention, interrogation, and prosecution of suspected 
terrorists” but that he simply would not interpret the NDAA as 
giving him the authority to detain citizens, even if the AUMF 
allowed it.176 One commentator has suggested “codifying such a 
view into law could be much more impactful than putting a stamp of 
the United States, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-
American Internment Cases, JUSTICE.GOV (May 20, 2011), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives
/1346. 
172. See Cleveland, supra note 89, at 1135; supra Part II.
173. See Cleveland, supra note 89, at 1135.
174. See id. at 1129.
175. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Dec. 31, 2011). 
176. Id.
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approval on the status quo” since the Supreme Court has yet to sign 
off on the Obama administration’s stance on detention authority.177 
That an outgoing commander-in-chief’s interpretation of 
deliberately ambiguous statutory language serves as the only 
safeguard of citizens’ right to be free from detention is an unsettling 
notion, one that has prompted several states, cities, and counties 
across the United States to codify laws opposing the enforcement of 
section 1021.178 Moreover, the 2013 and 2014 versions of the NDAA 
have preserved section 1021 in its entirety, though other provisions 
have been amended to reflect shifting priorities in the Obama 
administration’s wartime agenda.179 It seems as though section 1021, 
despite its shortcomings, is here to stay. 
Given the unsettled issue of detention authority, it is imperative 
to determine what, if anything, courts are empowered to do should 
they face another Hedges or Padilla case. Absent any compelling 
national emergency and the overhaul of domestic criminal law, U.S. 
citizens have a legitimate interest to be free from unjustified military 
detention without trial proceedings when it has not been established 
that they are terrorists. The constitutional guarantees in the Due 
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment, “[f]reedom from 
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms 
of physical restraint,”180 and the hard lesson learned from Korematsu 
render the issue of citizen detention one that warrants analysis under 
the Youngstown framework and the clear statement rule. 
Applying the Youngstown continuum of presidential power to 
the executive’s authority to detain civilians arrested on American soil 
gives courts an indication of the level of judicial deference to afford 
to executive actions. This Article asserts that with regard to citizen 
detention, the president has not been granted express congressional 
177. Benjamin Wittes, Raha Wala Writes His Own FAQ, LAWFARE (Dec. 20, 2011, 10:01
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/raha-wala-writes-his-own-faq/#more-4430. 
178. Allie Bohm, One Thing Maine, Virginia and Arizona Have in Common: Opposition to
the NDAA, ACLUBLOG (Apr. 27, 2012, 10:46 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national 
-security/one-thing-maine-virginia-and-arizona-have-common-opposition-ndaa (noting that
Virginia and Maine have passed legislation calling for the repeal of the NDAA’s detention
provisions).
179. The provision governing the closure of Guantanamo Bay was updated in the 2014
version of the NDAA, while the provision regarding indefinite military detention of citizens has 
yet to be reformed. Natasha Lennard, Obama Signs NDAA 2014, Indefinite Detention Remains, 
SALON (Dec. 27, 2013 04:38 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/12/27/obama_signs_ndaa_2014_i
ndefinite_detention_remains/. 
180. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
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authorization under the AUMF or NDAA to detain citizens found 
away from the theater of war. Reviewing Congress’s actions with a 
historical lens provides insight as to how the legislature regarded the 
power to detain U.S. citizens. During World War II, President 
Roosevelt issued proclamations under the Alien Enemy Act ordering 
the internment of “aliens” deemed likely to commit espionage or 
other hostile acts.181 When the president sought to include citizens, 
however, the executive order referring to citizen internment 
“appeared to rely on the nation’s war powers directly,” and not the 
Alien Enemy Act.182 Apparently, at that time, even “the War 
Department felt congressional authorization was necessary to 
provide authority for its enforcement.”183 Congress eventually passed 
legislation during the Cold War granting the president the power to 
detain citizens, a power it would invalidate twenty years later with 
the Non-Detention Act.184 
One could deduce from this series of legislative actions that 
Congress contemplated that the legislature, and not the executive, 
had the authority to make decisions regarding citizens’ liberty in the 
homeland. Though the Hamdi plurality declined to address whether 
the Non-Detention Act should apply to armed conflicts, Justice 
Souter’s reasoning that the Non-Detention Act still shielded citizens 
from detention without an explicit act of Congress to the contrary 
finds support in the history of the congressional actions that 
sanctioned and subsequently prohibited citizen detention. And while 
the canon of constitutional avoidance might call for a reading of the 
Non-Detention Act that upholds the constitutionality of the AUMF—
for example, that the Non-Detention Act only applies to civilian 
detention—the legislative intent of the Non-Detention Act would 
belie such an interpretation.185 Both supporters and opponents of the 
Non-Detention Act understood it to be a prohibition on all detentions 
by the executive branch, including both military and non-military 
detentions.186 
181. ELSEA, supra note 81, at 28.
182. Id. at 38.
183. Id. at 29.
184. Id. at 34–37.
185. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718–19 (2d Cir. 2003).
186. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 547 (2004) (“Representative Ichord, chairman of the
House Internal Security Committee and an opponent of the bill, feared that the redrafted statute 
would ‘deprive the President of his emergency powers and his most effective means of coping 
Spring 2015] CITIZEN DETENTION 959 
Thus, this Article suggests that the president is most likely 
situated somewhere within the zone of twilight, where congressional 
authorization of executive mandated detention of citizens captured 
on American soil is ambiguous at best, or in the third zone of 
presidential power, where executive powers are at their lowest. In 
these zones, courts are better able to counterbalance the executive 
branch to provide the judicial oversight that is necessary in situations 
where civil liberties are at stake. Moreover, both spheres permit 
courts to exercise broader discretion to scrutinize the president’s 
actions and to engage in meaningful balancing of the government 
and individual’s interests. 
However, courts might find the president to be acting with 
congressional authorization where Congress acted by issuing a broad 
authorization of force and codifying whatever detention authority, 
placing him firmly in the zone where his executive powers are at 
their maximum. The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Padilla supports this 
conclusion, given its reasoning that the AUMF authorized President 
Bush’s decision to hold Padilla incommunicado for over three 
years.187 In this zone of nearly unchecked executive war power, the 
concern that a future president could hold citizens indefinitely 
without charge or trial is not unfounded. Yet if a court were to 
determine the AUMF and NDAA adequately constitute the act of 
Congress required by the Non-Detention Act to rebut the prohibition 
on citizen detention, it should not end its judicial inquiry there. 
Courts have afforded great deference to executive actions in this 
war—and with good reason, some national security scholars 
argue188—but others would point out that this principle of limited 
judicial oversight cannot be reconciled in light of the separation of 
powers goal of safeguarding individual rights.189 
with sabotage and espionage agents in war-related crises.’ 117 CONG. REC., at 31,542. 
Representative Railsback, the bill’s sponsor, spoke of the bill in absolute terms: ‘[I]n order to 
prohibit arbitrary executive action, [the bill] assures that no detention of citizens can be 
undertaken by the Executive without the prior consent of the Congress.’ Id., at 31,551.”). 
187. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390–92 (4th Cir. 2005).
188. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 16 (2007) (“The real cause of deference to government in times of 
emergency is institutional: both Congress and the judiciary defer to the executive during 
emergencies because of the executive’s institutional advantages in speed, secrecy, and 
decisiveness.”). 
189. See David Cole, No Reason To Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power, and
Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (2008) (“Precisely because we rely so 
heavily on the executive to maintain our security, we should be skeptical of its ability to give 
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In the matter of citizen detention, it is especially incumbent 
upon “the judiciary [to] be a full player in the separation of powers 
framework,”190 while still preserving the proper balance of powers 
among the three branches. The government has already recognized 
that American citizenship of an alleged terrorist adversary warrants 
some minimal form of “special treatment.”191 As it stands now, the 
legislature has not come to a consensus on how expansive it 
considers the executive detention authority over citizens. Given the 
indeterminate state of the law, it is up to the judiciary to take on an 
active role that yields constitutionally consistent results without 
encroaching upon the executive’s unique ability to make swift 
decisions concerning matters of military judgment.192 Thus, this 
Article suggests that courts should find that without a clear statement 
to the contrary, the AUMF and NDAA do not authorize the 
Executive to order the indefinite detention of citizens who are not 
terrorist adversaries or whose adversary status is in dispute. 
The clear statement rule requires a “‘clear statement’ on the face 
of the statute to rebut a policy” that the Court presumes Congress 
intended to implement by enacting a particular statute.193 Legal 
scholars note that courts might resist the application of a clear 
statement rule to the AUMF and the NDAA in light of the 
well-established presumption against interpreting statutes as 
interfering with or derogating the president’s foreign affairs 
powers.194 However, when the statute in question is susceptible to 
interpretations that implicate the constitutional rights of individuals, 
there is a compelling need to apply a clear statement rule to ensure 
civil liberties are not unjustifiably diminished. 
Scholars arguing that the clear statement rule should be used in 
interpreting the AUMF have disagreed on what circumstances trigger 
sufficient weight to the liberty side of the balance.”); Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 
69 MO. L. REV. 903, 929 (2004). 
190. Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 884 (2013). 
191. Hope Metcalf & Judith Resnik, Gideon at Guantánamo: Democratic and Despotic
Detention, 122 YALE L.J. 2504, 2527 (2013). 
192. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Speech at Northwestern University School of Law
(Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech 
-1203051.html.
193. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595 n.4 (1992). 
194. See id. at 606; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2104 & n. 259 (2005). 
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its application. Some scholars reason that U.S. citizens detained on 
U.S. territory beyond the theater of war, regardless of their military 
designation, should invoke the clear statement rule,195 while others 
assert that the rule should only be triggered when the president is 
acting against noncombatants in the United States.196 Those that 
claim that a clear statement rule should be required whenever 
citizens are arrested in the United States cite the Non-Detention 
Act.197 While the premise is reasonable, the rule, as applied, would 
interfere with generally accepted wartime practices. Even when 
appropriately engaging in scrutiny of executive military decisions, 
courts cannot, by their actions, supersede or substitute their 
judgments for the commander-in-chief’s wartime decision-making 
authority.198 Allowing a clear statement rule for any American 
citizen who concedes adversary status would be counterproductive to 
the war effort, and thus too broad. 
On the other hand, other scholars would limit the application of 
a clear statement requirement on the basis of combatant status.199 
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith reason that a long history of 
detaining combatants and an analysis of the international laws of war 
provide strong support that the AUMF “need not specify all 
approved presidential wartime actions.”200 They argue that when 
“presidential action involves a traditional wartime function exercised 
by the president against an acknowledged enemy combatant,” the 
president’s inherent powers as commander-in-chief and interest in 
protecting the national security outweigh the liberty interest of the 
alleged terrorist adversary.201 
Therefore, Bradley and Goldsmith assert that the clear statement 
rule should only be triggered when the president acts to detain 
American citizens who are noncombatants.202 Their approach 
accounts for the fact that the United States is still actively engaged in 
war against enemy forces that would traditionally receive lesser 
195. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 170, at 2074.
196. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 194, at 2106.
197. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 170, at 2074.
198. See Daniel Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of
Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 1006 (1999) (“[T]he Court often contrasts the expertise of the 
officials under review to its own generalist and uninformed nature.”). 
199. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 194, at 2055–56.
200. Id. at 2054–55.
201. Id. at 2105.
202. Id. at 2106.
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protections under the LOAC than under the state’s domestic criminal 
law. Under the LOAC, a belligerent sovereign is entitled to deem 
individuals terrorist adversaries and administratively detain them, so 
Bradley and Goldsmith’s clear statement configuration affords 
appropriate deference to the commander-in-chief to immobilize those 
American citizens who pose genuine threats to national security. 
However, their suggestion requires ignoring the reality that the 
government’s process of designating combatants in this armed 
conflict has not always resulted in detention conditions that conform 
to LOAC and human rights law standards.203 Additionally, one 
commentator points out that basing the clear statement solely upon 
combatant status would result in a displacement of civilian law with 
martial law within the United States, where there is no compelling 
reason to do so absent battlefield conditions.204 
Another approach would be to use a clear statement rule in cases 
where the combatant status of the citizen detainee is disputed. One 
concern with this approach is that courts would have to initially 
adjudicate the propriety of a detainee’s combatant designation before 
determining whether a clear statement would apply. The 
government’s heightened interest in protectionism and national 
security might create a perverse incentive by which the government, 
to avoid triggering the clear statement rule, would be motivated to 
make unconfirmed allegations about individual detainees in order to 
label them suspected terrorist adversaries.205 This would essentially 
force courts to undertake statutory interpretation issues about 
military terms, such as “belligerent act” and “associated force,” 
concerns found in section 1021 that were not defined in the statute,206 
and to participate in factual inquiries that might be better handled by 
martial law experts. 
The concern that courts might face difficulties in determining 
whether the citizen’s combatant status is genuinely in dispute, 
however, does not outweigh the need to first adjudicate whether 
203. See supra Part II.A–B.
204. See Sarah Erickson-Muschko, Beyond Individual Status: The Clear Statement Rule and
the Scope of the AUMF Detention Authority in the United States, 101 GEO. L.J. 1399, 1420–21 
(2013). 
205. See generally id. (arguing that location of capture, regardless of combatant or
citizenship, should drive application of the clear statement rule to the AUMF and NDAA). 
206. Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (expressing frustration
with the government’s evasiveness when asked to define the terms at issue). 
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indefinite detention is the most appropriate method to deal with a 
citizen alleged to be a combatant. Where civilian law has yet to be 
supplanted by martial law in the United States, constitutional rights 
asserted on American soil exist to their fullest extent. Additionally, 
the act of detaining a belligerent’s own citizen within the 
belligerent’s territory is a practice consistently used in civil wars.207 
In this scenario, the nation’s own domestic law and all of its 
fundamental constitutional guarantees would duly kick in. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Article proposes that courts should apply a clear statement 
rule to the AUMF and NDAA that is triggered when United States 
citizens, whose combatant status is in dispute, are arrested, captured, 
or detained on American soil.208 This approach attempts to reconcile 
the existence of explicit congressional prohibition of citizen 
detention with the practical realities of a nation still engaged in 
military conflict.209 Using the clear statement rule places a thumb on 
the scale towards congressional intent, a more appropriate alternative 
to the presidential hand that has become a near-permanent fixture on 
the scale. A clear statement rule also acknowledges that Congress 
has historically legislated in the area of citizen detention during times 
of peace, and thus, appropriate in this winding down period of the 
current armed conflict. It also permits the judiciary to maintain some 
oversight of executive actions. 
Applying a clear statement requirement to the AUMF and 
NDAA would accomplish several important purposes. First, it would 
207. See, e.g., Letter from Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, to Winfield Scott, U.S.
Lieutenant Gen. (Apr. 27, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 347, 347 
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (authorizing General Winfield Scott to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus to assist in “repressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States”); see 
generally Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600 (2009) 
(discussing moments in history when the president suspended the writ of habeas corpus in times 
of national emergency). 
208. Here, the trigger for a clear statement makes an explicit distinction between United
States citizens and legal permanent residents detained in the United States, given that the text of 
the Non-Detention Act specifically and exclusively prohibits detention of American citizens 
absent congressional action. 
209. Courts have applied civilian and military law principles in tandem to justify the
indefinite detention of the few so-called combatants who were encountered at and away from the 
battlefield. See supra Part IV. Moreover, the Bush and Obama administrations, to varying 
degrees, couched their wartime rhetoric in traditional LOAC terms and principles. See supra Part 
II.A–B.
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likely function as a preliminary stopgap measure against ongoing 
detention without trial or access to lawyers for citizens like Jose 
Padilla, whose U.S. citizenship and presence on American soil 
necessarily warranted more due process protections under the Fifth 
Amendment than were initially provided. When a court receives a 
next-friend habeas petition on the citizen’s behalf, challenging the 
indefinite detention of the citizen, it need not find statutory 
authorization under the AUMF and NDAA for the citizen’s 
continued detention. Instead, the court could determine that even 
under the Youngstown framework, the president’s actions are not 
authorized by Congress, and therefore subject to judicial correction. 
In doing so, the court would be permitted flexibility in resolving the 
matter and could potentially choose to follow the lead of the district 
court that received Yaser Hamdi’s next-friend petition and appointed 
Hamdi unmonitored access to legal counsel.210 
Additionally, this Article also suggests that a clear statement 
rule balances the separation of powers principle of political 
accountability against the principle of preserving individual rights. 
Proponents of judicial deference to executive action assert the nature 
of the presidency as most amenable to the nation’s constituents;211 
this rationale is just as apposite for the legislature.212 In fact, because 
legislators are accountable to a different political constituency than 
the executive, when both political branches act in concert, this 
bilateral institutional endorsement of the government’s actions 
provides more support for what Justice Jackson imagined would be a 
legitimate justification for courts to take a backseat when reviewing 
exercises of executive war power. 
Moreover, because Congress generally cannot issue legislation 
with a high degree of specificity, “[c]ourts therefore will have a good 
deal of interpretive latitude to decide whether the congressional 
legislation is ‘close enough’ to be treated as effective endorsement of 
210. Order at 14–15, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:02cv439 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2002).
211. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4 (2010) (discussing the executive’s unique role to govern in crises). 
212. See Deeks, supra note 190, at 882–83; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between
Civil Libertarianism And Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach To Rights 
During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 17 (2004); Joseph Landau, Muscular 
Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 689 
n.136 (2009).
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the disputed executive action.”213 Courts are free to engage in some 
review, acting as a backseat driver of sorts. Thus, the due process test 
promulgated in Mathews v. Eldridge214 constrains the executive and 
legislative branch from unjustifiably depriving citizen detainees of 
their constitutional rights. The Mathews analysis ensures that the 
court makes a case-by-case determination of whether any risk of 
erroneous deprivation is too high to warrant the detention of an 
allegedly dangerous individual. 
What makes the Mathews analysis a vital companion to the clear 
statement rule is that it “is unaltered by the allegations surrounding 
the particular detainee or the organizations with which he is alleged 
to have associated.”215 Justice O’Connor determined in Hamdi that 
regardless of the veracity of the government’s allegations that Hamdi 
was an “enemy combatant,” his right to access counsel during his 
proceedings on remand was undeniable.216 Thus, courts are able to 
focus upon the constitutionality of the procedures afforded to the 
individual citizen detainee without engaging in impermissible 
judicial review that impinges upon the executive’s expansive Article 
II powers. Regardless of where the court deems the president is 
situated along the Youngstown continuum of power, it is entitled to 
evaluate the accused’s due process rights in relation to whatever 
compelling interest the government may put forth. Thus, the 
Mathews analysis preserves the balance between all three branches 
of government while seeking to ensure the individual citizen’s rights 
have not been unjustifiably derogated. 
Courts would also enjoy greater latitude to construe the 
provisions in section 1021 as providing citizen detainees with the 
options presented in sections 1021(c)(3)–(4), transfer to an 
appropriate alternative court with jurisdiction or repatriation to the 
person’s native country.217 Therefore, requiring courts to utilize a 
clear statement rule to the AUMF and the NDAA is paramount to 
213. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 212, at 38 (“[C]ongressional legislation as there is will
often be cast at a high level of generality. Only rarely will Congress have focused in an exact way 
on the precise assertion of executive authority at issue; more typically, Congress will have 
legislated, if at all, in more general terms, in contexts not exactly those in which the executive 
currently seeks to act.”). 
214. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
215. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004).
216. Id. at 539.
217. NDAA, supra note 11, § 1021(c)(1)–(4), 125 Stat. 1562 (2011).
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holding the president accountable when he seeks to significantly 
curtail liberties of U.S. citizens who have yet to be conclusively 
deemed terrorist adversaries. 
Finally, this Article suggests a simple revision of section 
1021(e) of the NDAA to include clearer language exempting citizens 
captured domestically from its reach. Section 1022(b) is an example 
of what the revision might look like; it includes unambiguous 
language that expressly exempts citizens from mandatory military 
detention.218 The provision is titled “Applicability to United States 
Citizens and Lawful Resident Aliens” and exempts citizens from 
mandatory military detention in subsection (1), as well as lawful 
resident aliens, to the extent permissible by the Constitution, in 
subsection (2).219 Thus, Congress should amend section 1021(e) to 
expressly prohibit the application of section 1021(b)–(d) to U.S. 
citizens captured on U.S. soil, and to permit detention of lawful 
resident aliens only to the extent allowable under the Constitution. 
The section 1021(e) language should be revised as follows: 
(e) AUTHORITIES.—Nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the
detention of lawful resident aliens of the United States or
any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United
States.
(1) APPLICABILITY TO UNITED STATES CITIZENS.
— Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the
detention of United States citizens captured or arrested in
the United States.
This long overdue revision would quell the fears that the Hedges
group voiced and satisfy the growing number of petitions opposing 
the detention statute. It would also eliminate the need for Congress to 
clarify the meaning of terms like “substantially supported” and 
“associated forces,” which the Hedges plaintiffs claimed were 
impermissibly vague. This is no small matter. The task of defining 
these technical terms is arguably beyond the scope of the 
legislature’s powers and is more appropriately entrusted to the 
executive branch, given that both the judiciary and Congress have 
traditionally deferred to the executive’s expertise in military 
218. Id. § 1022(b) (“The requirement to detain a person in military custody under this section
does not extend to citizens of the United States.”). 
219. Id. § 1022(b)(1)–(2).
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affairs.220 Still, the fact that the 2013 and 2014 versions of the 
NDAA have been approved without any further revision to section 
1021 makes it clear that there is little likelihood of success of 
amending the provision. Therefore, it is largely the responsibility of 
the courts to ensure the application of a clear statement rule to 
section 1021 of the NDAA in order to prevent the indefinite 
detention of American citizens on American soil without due 
process. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this unique issue where domestic and international law 
converge, courts must step up to the challenge of preserving the 
delicate balance between the three separate branches of government. 
This balance is the most compelling and enduring characteristic of 
the American Constitution. Justice O’Connor, writing for the Hamdi 
plurality, stated “[w]hatever power the United States Constitution 
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or 
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly 
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at 
stake.”221 Therefore, permitting courts to step in when elemental civil 
liberties hang in the balance is not only prudent, it is necessary to 
sustain the balanced power dynamic of the U.S. government. 
Applying tools like the clear statement requirement and the Mathews 
calculus to individual cases reaffirms the judiciary’s commitment to 
ensure the bedrock of liberty—constitutional due process—is not 
chipped away in the name of national security. History is a powerful 
reminder that a nation gripped with fear can leave indelible, almost 
irreversible scars upon its citizens. Thus, it is of utmost importance 
that courts do not flout the lessons of the past, but treat history as a 
guidepost to uphold the basic, fundamental rights of American 
citizens in the face of the novel challenges that characterize this “war 
on terror.” 
220. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 188, at 16 (“The real cause of deference to
government in times of emergency is institutional: both Congress and the judiciary defer to the 
executive during emergencies because of the executive's institutional advantages in speed, 
secrecy, and decisiveness.”). 
221. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
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